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Abstract: This paper measures the impact of 30 Walmart openings on the municipal tax base 
using panel data for New Jersey municipalities from 1998-2007. We consider the impact of the 
new Walmart on the home municipality as well as the nearest adjacent municipality in the year 
the outlet opens as well as the two subsequent years. Because Walmart may exert differing 
effects on residential and non-residential values, we undertake separate analyses of the impact 
of Walmart on the residential and non-residential tax bases. We find that a new Walmart has a 
significant positive impact on the growth in the tax base in host municipalities the second year 
that it is open, but not in years one and three. In addition, the impact of the Walmart on the 
growth in the tax base depends on the size of the municipality. In the average-sized municipality, 
the real equalized tax base growth rate rises only about 0.35 percentage points in the second 
year. This effect is primarily the result of Walmart’s impact on residential values in the host 
municipality. By contrast, a new Walmart causes a modest but consistently negative effect on 
growth of the tax base in the adjacent municipality across all three years that we are able to 
measure. In the average sized municipality for our sample, the real equalized tax base growth 
rate falls rate falls 0.065, 0.081, and 0.096 percentage points, respectively. This effect occurs 
primarily through the Walmart’s impact on growth of non-residential values. The cumulative 
effect of this reduction in growth in the adjacent municipality is roughly two thirds of the 
increase in growth experienced by the home municipality.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Proposals to open a new Walmart have been the subject of controversy in countless 
communities across the nation. On one side, Walmart proponents typically argue that the new 
store will increase employment, attract additional commercial development, foster lower prices 
on consumer goods, and generate higher levels of tax revenue by increasing the tax base. In 
contrast, opponents contend that Walmart drives out smaller, locally owned businesses, leaving 
vacant tracts of property and reducing property values. Worse yet, the bankruptcies cause a 
decrease in wages and an increase in unemployment.  
But because ultimate authority for new development typically rests with the municipal 
government and local planning board, the fiscal impact of the new Walmart on the municipal tax 
base and budget is often the focus of the debate. The tax base of a municipality, which is the 
total value of all taxable real estate, is the primary source of revenue to fund local services such 
as police, fire, school systems, sewer, garbage collection, and road maintenance. Because tax 
base expansion results in more revenue to fund municipal services and may even allow officials 
to cut the tax rate, municipal officials are often motivated by a desire to expand the tax base. 
 It seems obvious that the municipal tax base will rise with the construction of a Walmart 
because the value of the new store is added to the tax base. Indeed, the positive impact of a new 
Walmart on the tax base may extend beyond the direct effect of adding the value of the Walmart 
store to the tax base. Walmart’s presence may attract other commercial and retail stores, 
increasing both the number of properties on the tax rolls but also the value of commercial 
property in the area. Because homeowners typically value convenient access to consumer goods, 
this retail expansion may in turn raise values of nearby residential properties. Adding to the 
desirability of retail expansion is the perception that Walmart and other “big-box” retailers 
require little in terms of public services such as sewer and garbage collection relative to their 
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contribution to the tax base. Thus, Walmart and other “big-box” retailers, according to Boarnet 
and Crane (1999) are, “often characterized as no-brainers, fiscally speaking.”  
Of course, opponents of Walmart are usually skeptical of such claims. Because the tax 
base is not only dependent on the number of properties on the tax roll but also the value of those 
properties, it is possible that new development can actually diminish the tax base by decreasing 
other property values in town (Gscottshneider 1998). Such externalities from new development 
may stem from developing incompatible uses in adjoining lots or from simple spillover effects 
that are unavoidable. For instance, a new industrial park bordering a residential neighborhood, 
may cause a reduction in residential values sufficient to lower the total tax base. In addition, 
property values may fall simply because of the noise, traffic and trash from a new retail 
development.  
These externalities do not respect municipal borders and as a consequence the net 
benefits of a new Walmart may not be distributed evenly across municipalities. The nearest 
adjacent municipality to the new Walmart does not receive the direct benefit of adding the 
market value of the Walmart outlet to the tax base but may face many of its negative 
externalities. A Walmart in one municipality may decrease the value of other shopping centers 
nearby. The impact on residential property values is less obvious. However, it is possible that 
they may fall because negative externalities such as increased traffic, noise, and trash more than 
offset the benefits of access to the Walmart.  
Given this, adjacent municipalities may receive little benefit from the new Walmart yet 
face many of the costs. Thus, Walmart’s potential impact on adjacent municipalities’ tax base is 
also a topic of controversy. Even assuming that Walmarts require few municipal services, it is 
not clear that Walmarts are a “no-brainer.” To date, the economic literature has gathered little 
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evidence on this question, and as a result, decision makers have little evidence on which to base 
their judgments.  
We choose to examine the impact of Walmart because it is the largest retailer in the U.S. 
and a leading practitioner of the “big box” retailing format. In fact, Walmart is the largest private 
employer in the U.S. with over 1.4 million employees and over 4,200 stores.
1
 Our data includes 
30 Walmart openings in the State of New Jersey for the period 1998-2007. As of April 2011, 
there were 65 Walmart stores including 43 discount stores, 10 Sam’s Clubs and 12 Supercenters 
in the State of New Jersey.
2
  The stores employed 17,361 associates and collected more than 
$141 million in sales tax and paid more than $45.8 million in state and local taxes in 2011.   
While researchers have analyzed the impact of a Walmart on retail prices, employment 
levels, wages, poverty, and social capital, there is little economic literature on the effect of 
Walmart on the tax base. This paper seeks to augment the existing Walmart literature by 
assessing the impact of a new Walmart on the tax base in its home municipality and the closest 
adjacent municipality in the year the outlet opens as well as the two subsequent years. To better 
understand the mechanics of Walmart’s impact on the tax base, we also examine the separate 
effects of Walmart on residential and non-residential values. This paper begins with a review of 
the currently available literature on the effect of Walmart store openings.  In the subsequent 
section, we report the results of our panel data analysis.  
We find that a new Walmart has a significant positive impact on the growth in the tax 
base in host municipalities the second year that it is open, but not in years one and three. In 
addition, the impact of the Walmart on the growth of the tax base depends on the size of the 
municipality. In the average sized municipality for our sample, the real equalized tax base 
growth rate rises only about 0.35 percentage points. This impact is primarily the result of 
                                                          
1
 http://walmartstores.com/pressroom/FactSheets/ 
2
 http://walmartstores.com/pressroom/StateByState/State.aspx?st=NJ 
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Walmart’s impact on residential values in the host municipality. By contrast, a new Walmart 
causes a modest but consistently negative effect on growth of the tax base in the adjacent 
municipality across all three years that we are able to measure. In the average sized municipality 
for our sample, the real equalized tax base growth rate falls rate falls 0.065, 0.081, and 0.096 
percentage points respectively. This effect occurs primarily through the Walmart’s impact on 
growth of non-residential values. The cumulative effect of this reduction in growth in the 
adjacent municipality is roughly two thirds of the increase in growth experienced by the home 
municipality.  
 
II. Literature Review 
Several recent studies have examined Walmart’s effect on the tax base, tax revenues, and 
residential property values (Muller and Humstone 1996; Hicks 2007; Johnson et al. 2009). 
However, none of these studies employ statistical designs that allow reliable inferences on the 
causal effect of Walmart on the tax base nor do they attempt to disaggregate this effect by 
analyzing the impact of Walmart on the residential and non-residential tax bases. Muller and 
Humstone (1996) conducted a series of case studies on three Iowa communities and nine 
counties in Iowa were Walmarts opened. The case studies found that Walmart initially added 
around $2 million to the local tax-base. However, many downtown businesses began to close 
following Walmart’s entrance, and nearby commercial property values declined as a result.  
Similarly, Johnson et al. (2009) examined the effect of 13 big box stores (5 Walmarts, 3 
Kmarts, 3 Targets and 3 Best Buys) in El Paso county Colorado between 1994 and 2005.  They 
found a $7,000 penalty for properties within 2 miles of a Walmart but a premium of $29,107 to 
$39,222 for properties within 2 miles of a K-mart, Target or Best Buy. The authors do not claim 
that Walmart in fact causes the reduction in property values. Instead, they point out that it is 
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possible that Walmart chooses locations in lower value neighborhoods. Thus, Walmart 
opponents may have it exactly backwards – low property values cause Walmarts and not the 
reverse.  
 Hicks (2007) includes better statistical controls and finds a more favorable impact from 
Walmart on local commercial and industrial property tax revenues. The paper analyzes 
Walmart’s effect on county level commercial and industrial property tax revenues using a panel 
of Ohio’s 88 counties from the years 1985 to 2003 and finds that a Walmart increases county-
level property tax collections between $350,000 and $1.3 million annually. However, he points 
out that these estimates should be viewed with caution because he is not able to completely 
control for the intra-county variability in rates. 
While the literature that assesses Walmart’s impact on the tax base is limited, an 
extensive literature explores Walmart’s effects on retail prices (Basker, 2005a; Hausman and 
Liebtag, 2007), retail sales (Stone 1997; Artz and McConnon 2001; Artz and Stone 2006; Cotton 
and Cachon 2007), the number of retail establishments (Hicks and Wilburn 2001; Hicks 2009; 
Haltiwanger et al. 2009; Paruchuri et al. 2009), employment and wages (Hicks and Wilburn 
2001; Basker 2005b, Neumark et al. 2008; Hicks 2008), and poverty (Goetz and Swaminathan 
2006; Hicks 2005, 2007). It is no secret that Walmart thrives by providing consumers with goods 
at lower prices than competitors. This strategy tends to lower prices in the markets it enters, as 
well as increase consumer surplus, especially for low income households (Basker, 2005a; 
Hausman and Liebtag, 2007).  
Basker (2005a) analyzed the effect of Walmart’s price-slashing strategy on retail prices 
in the markets it enters. Comparing the prices of 10 products in markets Walmart had entered to 
those where it did not, he found that Walmart’s entrance into a market reduces average prices by 
1.5 percent to 3 percent in the short run and up to four times that in a the long run. Hausman and 
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Liebtag (2007) analyzed the price reduction effect from Walmart’s supercenter expansion 
(grocery retail) on consumer welfare and found that Walmart’s Supercenters have a total 
compensating variation of 25 percent of food expenditures. This implies that consumers save 
about 25 percent of their food expenditures by shopping at Walmart than if they were to buy the 
same goods from other retailers.  Moreover, even consumers that do not shop at Walmart receive 
benefits as other retailers respond to the new Walmart by cutting prices.  
 While several studies have shown that Walmart increases the levels of sales in a given 
area, these sales come at the expense of sales in adjacent areas. Stone (1997) compared the retail 
performance of 34 towns in Iowa that had a Walmart for 10 years or more to 15 demographically 
similar towns that did not have a Walmart over a ten-year period. He found that the total level of 
sales in Iowa towns that receive a Walmart increases every year over the ten-year period, while 
those nearby rural towns lose sales year after year. 
 In a similar vein, Artz and McConnon (2001) analyzed the average change in sales in 
towns with a Walmart versus those in towns without a Walmart. They found that general 
merchandise sales in Walmart towns nearly doubled after 5 years of receiving a Walmart 
compared to non-Walmart towns which only had only an 11 percent increase. This study also 
found that host towns trade areas increased nearly 50 percent while non-Walmart towns suffered 
a 6.1 percent decline in the size of their trade area.  
Naturally, many people, retailers especially, are concerned that a new Walmart will 
decrease sales at other local retail outlets. Muller and Humstone (1996) found that 84 percent of 
sales at a new Walmart came at the expense of businesses in the same county. Despite increased 
total sales in towns with Walmarts, Stone (1997) found that many retailers lose sales to` 
Walmart. Sectors that are likely to benefit from the arrival of a Walmart are home furnishings, 
restaurants, and general merchandise. The increases in sales in a Walmart community from 
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general merchandise are likely to be large enough that they offset the sales losses in food, 
specialty stores, and other sectors (Stone 1997).  
Similarly, Artz and Stone (2006) analyzed changes in retail grocery sales after  a 
Walmart Supercenter opened in Mississippi using a difference-in-difference estimation strategy 
that compared host counties before and after the entrance of a Walmart Supercenter to those 
counties without a Walmart Supercenter. They found that a new Walmart Supercenter captured 4 
percent of retail grocery sales in metropolitan areas and 17 percent in nonmetropolitan areas. 
Artz and McConnon (2001) also found evidence that Walmart has a negative impact on “other” 
stores as sales in this sector in host towns declined for three years while non-Walmart towns’ 
sales had increased. Interestingly, Cotton and Cachon (2007) employed survey data to examine 
the sales of local retail businesses in towns where Walmart recently opened and found that 
though two-thirds had sales that declined. However, one-third actually had a growth in sales of 
over 21 percent. The authors attribute this growth to differentiation and niche marketing (Cotton 
and Cachon, 2007). 
 As prices and sales fall for other local businesses, we would expect a decrease in the total 
number of retail establishments; however, research shows mixed results. Muller and Humstone 
(1996) found that five years after the opening of the Walmart there was a net loss in the number 
of retail stores downtown, with the majority of closings in the category of general merchandise. 
Basker (2005b) finds that after a five-year period the average Walmart displaces 4 small (i.e., 20 
or fewer employees) retailers. Medium-sized (i.e., 20-99 employees) retailers fare a bit better. 
After 5 years, Walmart causes a reduction of only 0.7 medium-sized retailers. By contrast, Hicks 
and Wilburn (2001) find the opposite result. They examined the effect of Walmart’s entrance on 
the retail trade sector in West Virginia counties over an eight-year period.  They discovered that 
Walmart actually causes a modest increase in the number of retail firms in the same county. 
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Similarly, Hicks (2009) found weak evidence that Walmart can increase the number of small 
firms in a county while decreasing the number in adjacent counties.  
Proximity to a big-box store may also effect entry and exit rates of smaller stores.  
Analyzing the metropolitan Washington, D.C. region, Haltiwanger et al. (2009) contend that 
there is a strong negative effect on retail establishments located near (1 to 5 miles) a big-box 
store.  Smaller stores located further away (5 to 10 miles) from big-box stores are not as 
negatively impacted.  The size of the negative effect depends on whether or not a smaller store 
competes in the same retail category as the larger chains.  For example, a restaurant thrives when 
it is located in close proximity to a Walmart or another big-box store.  This is most likely due to 
the increase in traffic associated with the big box store.  
Paruchuri et al. (2009) studied Walmart’s effect on the exit and entry rates of 
independent retailers by zip code over a 25-year period. They conclude that in the same zip code, 
Walmart does not increase exit rates but rather decreases entry rates. In other words, Walmart 
does not drive existing businesses out of town, but rather reduces the number of new businesses. 
On the other hand, in zip codes adjacent to those that have a Walmart the exit rate is greater than 
the rate of entry.  
Because Walmart has had such a large impact on the economic organization of retailing, 
researchers have also examined whether Walmart impacts employment in retailing. The results, 
however, are mixed. Hicks and Wilburn (2001) find weak statistical evidence that Walmart 
causes an increase in county-level retail employment. Basker (2005b) finds that in the first year 
after a Walmart opens, retail employment increases by 100 at the county level, however only 
half of these jobs remain after five years. In addition, wholesale employment decreases by 20 
jobs. By contrast, Neumark et al. (2008) find that a new Walmart cuts retail employment at the 
county level by about 180 employees. On retail earnings, the results are also mixed. Neumark et 
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al. find that Walmart reduces retail earnings at the county level by about 2.8 percent but Hicks 
and Wilburn (2001) and Hicks (2008) find that Walmart causes a significant increase in the 
wages of retail employees.  
 As Walmart is often criticized for its low wages, meager benefits, and heavy reliance on 
part-time employees, it is not surprising that researchers have examined Walmart’s impact on 
poverty. To determine the impact, Goetz and Swaminathan (2006) studied county-level family-
poverty rates over an eleven-year period and found that poverty rates increased more (or 
decreased less) in those counties where Walmart opened a store or added more stores. They 
argue that poverty rates rise because Walmart creates an externality. In addition to this, Hicks 
(2005, 2007) finds that Walmart also increases the number of EITC claims in addition to 
Medicaid expenditures in a county. These findings suggest there are other costs to social 
programs that are associated with the presence of a Walmart. 
 Even if a new Walmart attracts low-wage workers, decreases the number of retail 
establishments, and increases the number of Medicaid claims in a county, the tax base may still 
rise. These studies suggest that Walmart’s tax-revenue argument may not be as straightforward 
as formerly thought, but rather can have a range of components.  
 
III. Data and Methods 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze Walmart’s effect on the growth of the real 
equalized tax base and on the growth of real equalized residential and non-residential property 
values. These growth rates were calculated using a year-over-year calculation for the entire time 
period (i.e., Tax Base Growthit  = (Real Equalized Tax Baseit – Real Equalized Tax Baseit-1)/ 
Real Equalized Tax Baseit-1). We analyze the growth in the tax base rather than the level of the 
tax base for four reasons. First, using growth rates allows us to address endogeneity concerns 
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between the tax base and the tax rate (Vandegrift and Lahr 2011). By lagging the growth of the 
tax rate, we can ensure that that the tax base is not causing changes in the tax rate as it is highly 
unlikely that growth in the tax base in period t could cause growth in the tax rate in period t-2. 
Endogeneity between the tax rate level and the tax base level occurs because a higher tax base 
allows municipalities to raise the same revenue from a lower tax rate. At the same time, higher 
tax rates make development less desirable and therefore depress the tax base.  
Second, use of growth rates allows us to determine the effect of the Walmart entry on the 
tax base over time. That is, we can determine whether the Walmart provides a one-time bump (or 
dip) to the tax base or initiates a long-term process of growth (or decline). Third, using growth 
rates allows us to draw clear causal inferences about the effect of a Walmart on the tax base. We 
can test to ensure that Walmart is not entering slow or fast growing municipalities. That is, we 
can examine growth rates of the tax base prior to the date the new Walmart is built to rule out the 
possibility that growth or decline of the municipality causes the Walmart.  We adopt a similar 
strategy in our analysis of the effect of a new Walmart on the residential and non-residential 
property values. Finally, use of growth rates allows us to correct for differences in municipality 
size.  
To conduct the analysis, we merge data sources and construct a panel data set at the 
municipal level in New Jersey over a ten-year period from 1998 to 2007.  The first data source 
includes 30 Walmart store openings that occurred in New Jersey from 1998 to 2007.  The New 
Jersey Walmart openings were drawn from a master sheet for all Walmart openings in the United 
States from 1962 to January 2006 compiled by Thomas J. Holmes and posted on his internet 
homepage under the title, “Diffusion of Walmart and Economies of Density.”3  To identify the 
Walmart stores that opened in New Jersey between February 2006 to December 2007, we 
                                                          
3
 Retrieved from http://www.econ.umn.edu/~holmes/data/WalMart/index.html 
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reviewed Walmart’s Annual Reports and found five additional openings in this period.4 We then 
reviewed Walmart press releases for openings in New Jersey to determine where and when these 
openings occurred.
 5
 Some of the stores were opened in unincorporated areas under the 
jurisdiction of larger municipalities.  Consequently, we contacted the relevant municipal 
governments to ensure that our store opening data matched the municipal tax base data. Because 
we calculate growth rates of the key variables and then lag some of the growth rates two years, 
we lose three years of observations (1998-2000).  
 The second data set includes data on New Jersey property tax rates, the total tax base, tax 
base data by development type (e.g., residential), and the equalization ratio for all 566 
municipalities in New Jersey from 1998-2007. These data were obtained from the New Jersey 
Department of Community Affairs - Division of Local Government Services.
6
 The tax rate, tax 
base, and residential values were all equalized using the equalization ratio. We also correct for 
inflation in the tax base variables using the GDP deflator (2005 dollars).  
  To determine the impact of a new Walmart on the tax base in its home municipality and 
the closest adjacent municipality, we created two dummy variables that were then transformed to 
take into consideration the size of the municipality. The first dummy variable, OpnYrit, takes the 
value 1 in the year t a Walmart store opens in municipality i and 0 otherwise. Over the entire 
study period, 30 Walmarts opened and the openings are relatively evenly distributed across the 
time period (1998: 2, 1999: 2, 2000: 3, 2001: 3, 2002: 2, 2003: 3, 2004: 6, 2005: 4, 2006: 5, 
2007: 0).  The second dummy variable, Adj OpnYrit, takes the value 1 for the next closest 
municipality in the year a Walmart opens in municipality j. To locate the nearest adjacent 
municipality to a particular Walmart, we used GoogleMaps to first locate each of the 30 Walmart 
                                                          
4
 Retrieved from http://walmartstores.com/media/investors/2007_annual_report.pdf; and    
http://walmartstores.com/sites/AnnualReport/2008/docs/wal_mart_annual_report_2008.pdf 
5
 Retrieved from http://walmartstores.com/pressroom/news/ 
6
 Retrieved from http://www.state.nj.us/dca/lgs/taxes/taxmenu.shtml 
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stores previously identified.  We then found the bordering municipality closest to the Walmart 
location. Since municipality borders are not shown in GoogleMaps, we cross-referenced with a 
municipality map obtained from the Office of State Planning for New Jersey.
7
  
Because the impact of a Walmart on the tax base growth will vary with the size of the 
municipality, we transform our dummy variables to account for the size of the municipality. We 
expect that the impact of a Walmart will diminish in the absolute size of the tax base as well as 
the geographic area of the municipality. The effect of a new Walmart on growth of the tax base 
will be smaller in a municipality with a tax base of $50 billion than a municipality with a tax 
base of $50 million. Likewise, the effect of a new Walmart on growth of the tax base will be 
smaller in a municipality with an area of 30,000 acres than in a municipality with an area of 
3,000 acres. Any impact from Walmart on property values, and therefore the tax base, likely 
diminishes in the distance from the Walmart. In larger municipalities, the average property will 
be further from the Walmart. Consequently, we divide our Walmart dummies (OpnYrit, Adj 
OpnYrit) by the area of municipality i to create (OpnYr/Acresit and Adj OpnYr/Acresit). Because 
we wish to capture the impact of a Walmart on the growth of the tax base in years following the 
opening year, we also created a one- and two-year lag of OpnYr/Acresit and Adj OpnYr/Acresit.  
Using the tax rate data described above, we create two variables: the growth rate of the 
equalized tax rate and the level of the equalized tax rate. Each variable is lagged two years to 
address the endogeneity concerns discussed above. We expect a negative relation between 
lagged tax rate growth and the growth of the tax base variables. Growth in property tax rates 
should make property ownership less desirable and therefore reduce property prices. This should 
in turn reduce the growth of the tax base variables. The lagged tax rate level is a proxy for the 
                                                          
7
 http://www.nj.gov/dca/divisions/osg/docs/municipalitiesmap.pdf 
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quality of services offered by the municipality. Thus, we expect a positive relation between the 
lagged equalized tax rate and the growth of the tax base variables.  
We also use high school standardized test scores to create two additional control 
variables: Lang Scores and Lang Scores Growth. Because the standardized test the State 
administers to every 11
th
 grader in a New Jersey high school was reconfigured during the study 
period, we must normalize the data by year to ensure that the data are comparable across years.
8
 
Calculating the year-over-year growth in the normalized scores implies that we are essentially 
calculating growth in rank. The state reports the student pass rate by high school (not by 
municipality) for every high school in the state.  
Because some municipalities have multiple high schools while other municipalities share 
a high school, the data had to be resorted. For municipalities with multiple high schools, we 
weight the pass rate (i.e., the percentage of students deemed “proficient”) by the total student 
population of the respective high schools. Finally, the tests assess both math and language arts 
skills and, for a given high school, the pass rates on these sections are highly correlated. 
Consequently, we use only the language arts pass rate to construct in our regressions.  The 
lagged test scores should show a positive effect on the growth of the tax base. The positive effect 
occurs because the amenity is capitalized into higher property values. In addition, the variable 
may serve as a proxy for the quality of municipal services more generally. Finally, we include a 
series of year dummies in our regressions to capture the effect of changes in macroeconomic 
conditions on the tax base. Thus, we estimate the following equation:  
(1) Tax Base Growthit = γ1 OpnYrit,t-1,t-2  + γ2 Adj OpnYrit,t-1,t-2  + γ3 Tax Rate Growthit-2  +   
Xit Γ+ δtτ + αi  +  uit        where i= 1,…,N (municipalities); t = 2001,…,2007 (years). 
                                                          
8
 Until 2001, the State of New Jersey administered the High School Proficiency Test (HSPT). After 2001, the State 
switched to the High School Proficiency Assessment (HSPA). 
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Xit is a vector of control variables that includes the equalized tax base per acre, the equalized tax 
rate lagged two years, normalized standardized language test scores lagged two years, and 
growth in normalized standardized language test scores lagged two years. τ is a vector of time 
dummies; αi accounts for municipality fixed effects; and uit is the transitory error term that varies 
across municipalities and time-periods. We estimate similar equations for the growth in 
residential and non-residential tax bases. For these estimates, we simply substitute either growth 
in residential and non-residential tax base for the dependent variable and substitute either 
equalized residential values per acre or equalized non-residential values per acre for the 
equalized tax base per acre.  
 
IV. Results 
 Table 1 shows means and standard deviations for growth in the tax base, growth in 
residential values, and growth in non-residential values. From column 2 we see that over the nine 
year period from 1999-2007 there is an average growth of about 8 percent a year in the real 
equalized tax base across all municipalities. The tax base growth rate rises during the early years 
in the study (1999-2003), levels off (2003-2006), and then falls in the final year of the study 
(2007). From column 3, we see that variation in the growth rates across municipalities is 
especially high in 2002 and 2003. From column 4, we see that growth in residential values 
follows the same pattern as the overall tax base growth and the variation in the growth rates is 
also essentially the same. This is not surprising, as residential values are about 75 percent of the 
total tax base. For non-residential values growth, the increase and then the decrease from the 
peak is more pronounced compared to the tax base growth. In addition, the variation in the 
growth rates is greater for non-residential values. 
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 Table 2 displays the means and standard deviations for the independent variables. The 
average New Jersey municipality is about 8,400 acres but the standard deviation is large. The 
mean real equalized tax base per acre is roughly $570,000 but once again, there is quite a bit of 
variation across municipalities. Variation in the equalized property tax rate is substantially lower. 
Because of growth in the tax base over the period, the equalized property tax rate generally 
declines over the period.  
 
Effect of Walmart on the Growth Rate of the Tax Base 
 To estimate the effect of Walmart openings on the growth of the tax base, controlling for 
the growth in the tax rate and other municipal characteristics, we run regressions based on 
equation (1) above. We employ a fixed-effects regression procedure (rather than random effects) 
based on the results of a Hausman test (χ2 = 112.3, p < 0.001). Column 2 of Table 3 reports the 
results of a fixed-effects regression with robust standard errors. However, a Wooldridge test 
suggests that serial autocorrelation is present (F = 21.7, p < 0.001). Based on this result and the 
likelihood that spatial autocorrelation is also present, we estimate the same relation as column 2 
with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.
9
 The results of this estimation appear in column 3. Column 
4 adds controls based on standardized test scores (Lang Scores t-2 and Lang Scores Growth t-2). 
However, a Wooldridge test, once again, indicates the presence of serial autocorrelation (F = 
22.5, p < 0.001). Consequently, we re-estimate the equation in column 4 with Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors. The results appear in column 5.   
From column 5 of Table 3, we see that a new Walmart in municipality i has no 
statistically significant effect on the growth in the real equalized tax base in municipality i the 
first year it is open (OpnYr/Acres t). However, the second year the Walmart is open the growth 
                                                          
9
 Driscoll and Kraay (1998) devise a covariance matrix estimation technique for panel data that produces standard 
error estimates that are robust to general forms of spatial and temporal dependence.   
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in the real equalized tax base in municipality i increases significantly (OpnYr/Acres t-1). If we 
evaluate the estimate at mean acreage for the data set (8,431 acres), we see that the real 
equalized tax base growth rate rises 0.35 percentage points (30.14/8,431). Given that average 
annual growth in the tax base is about 8 percent over the period, the new Walmart raises the tax 
base growth only an additional 4 percent (0.35/8.2).  
Of course, the impact of a new Walmart is larger in smaller municipalities. For instance, 
if we evaluate the impact of a new Walmart in a municipality in the 10
th
 percentile (509 acres) of 
the size distribution, we see that the real equalized tax base growth rate rises 5.9 percentage 
points (30.14/509). In this case, the new Walmart increases the tax base by an additional 72 
percent (5.9/8.2). On the other hand, the effect of a new Walmart on the real equalized tax base 
growth rate essentially disappears if we evaluate the impact of a new Walmart in a municipality 
in the 90
th
 percentile of the size distribution (24,183 acres). In this case, the new Walmart 
increases the real equalized tax base growth rate by only 0.12 percentage points (30.14/24,183). 
While the estimated impact of the Walmart is positive in the third year (OpnYr/Acres t-2), the 
standard error is large and the estimate cannot be statistically bounded from zero.   
 By contrast, the new Walmart reduces the real equalized tax base growth in the closest 
adjacent municipality. The effect of the Walmart on the real equalized tax base growth rate in 
any one year is modest. However, the effect is statistically significant across all three years.  
Summing the impact across all three years, eliminates about two thirds of the gains realized by 
the municipality where the new Walmart is built. From column 5 of Table 3, we see that a new 
Walmart in municipality i has a negative and statistically significant effect on the growth in the 
real equalized tax base in the next closest municipality (Adj OpnYr/Acres). If we evaluate the 
estimates for each of the three years at mean acreage for the data set (8,431 acres), we see that 
the real equalized tax base growth rate falls 0.065, 0.081, and 0.096 percentage points 
  17 
 
respectively. Given that average annual growth in the tax base is about 8 percent over the period, 
the new Walmart reduces the tax base growth by only about 3 percent after 3 years (0.242/8.2).  
If we evaluate the impact of a new Walmart on the adjacent municipality when the 
adjacent municipality is in the 10
th
 percentile (509 acres) of the size distribution, we see that the 
real equalized tax base growth rate decreases by a larger amount (4.0 percentage points) after 3 
years. Thus, the new Walmart decreases the tax base growth by about 49 percent after 3 years. 
The effect of a new Walmart on the real equalized tax base growth rate essentially disappears if 
we evaluate the impact of a new Walmart for a municipality in the 90
th
 percentile (24,183 acres).   
Given that the impact of a new Walmart on the adjacent municipality is significant across 
all three years, we test for the impact in the fourth year. While the estimate is negative, it is not 
statistically significant. Keeping in mind that we reduce the number of Walmarts in our sample 
with each lag, the result may simply reflect the limitations of the data set.  Finally, we test 
whether Walmart chooses fast growing municipalities as locations for its outlets. We test for this 
effect by adding a dummy for a Walmart location in municipality i and then leading the variable 
(rather than lagging) by one year. The results (not reported) show that municipalities where 
Walmarts will be built do not have significantly faster (or slower) rates of growth of their real 
equalized tax base than municipalities where Walmarts are not built (β = 0.0076, p = 0.17).   
Finally, we note that controls for tax rate, tax rate growth, language scores, growth in 
language scores, and the year dummies are statistically significant (except the dummy for 2007). 
Ten percent growth in the tax rate in year t-2 reduces growth in the tax base after two years by 
0.68 percentage points. By contrast, a tax rate level that is higher by one dollar in year t-2 is 
associated with a tax base growth rate that is 6.8 percentage points higher. This likely captures 
the higher levels of municipal services are associated with higher growth. Likewise, higher 
language scores in year t-2 are associated with more growth in the tax base. An increase of one 
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standard deviation in language scores increases growth rate the tax base 1.1 percent percentage 
points. Finally, growth in language scores causes a reduction in tax base growth. This result is 
somewhat surprising but is likely the result of the fact that we normalized the test scores across 
years. Thus, the variable reflects changes in rank over time. Because low ranked schools are 
more able to improve their rank and these low ranked areas have less tax base growth, we find a 
negative effect.   
 
Effect of Walmart on the Growth Rate of Residential and Non-Residential Values 
To better understand the mechanism through which a new Walmart increases the tax base 
in its home municipality and reduces the tax base in the nearest adjacent municipality, we 
disaggregate the tax base into residential and non-residential components. The results on the 
regressions on the growth of residential values by municipality are reported in Table 4. The non-
residential estimates are shown in Table 5. For consistency, Tables 4 and 5 repeat the same basic 
specifications as Table 3. In the case of Table 4, we substitute the real equalized growth rate of 
residential values (dependent variable) for the real equalized growth rate of the tax base. We also 
substitute the real equalized residential value per acre for the real equalized tax base per acre on 
the right-hand side of the equation. In the case of Table 5, we substitute the real equalized 
growth rate of non-residential values (dependent variable) for the real equalized growth rate of 
the tax base and we substitute the real equalized non-residential value per acre for the real 
equalized tax base per acre on the right-hand side of the equation. 
The fixed effects estimates reported in columns 2 and 4 of Table 4 show evidence of 
serial correlation (F = 11.33, p = 0.001; F = 11.61, p = 0.001) but the fixed effects estimates 
reported in columns 2 and 4 of Table 5 do not (F = 0.943, p = 0.33; F = 0.968, p = 0.33). Even 
though the estimates in Table 5 show no evidence of autocorrelation, we follow the pattern 
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established in Table 3 and report both fixed effects estimates with both robust standard errors 
and Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.  We prefer the Driscoll-Kraay standard errors even for the 
Table 5 estimates because spatial autocorrelation may bias the robust standard errors even if 
there is no serial correlation.  
From column 5 of Table 4 we see that  we see that a new Walmart in municipality i has 
no statistically significant effect on the growth in the real equalized residential values in 
municipality i in either the first year it is open (OpnYr/Acres t) or in the third year (OpnYr/Acres 
t-2). However, the second year the Walmart is open the growth in the real equalized residential 
values in municipality i increase significantly (OpnYr/Acres t-1). If we evaluate the estimate at 
mean acreage for the data set (8,431 acres), we see that the real equalized residential values 
growth rate rises 0.45 percentage points (38.01/8,431). Given that average annual growth in the 
tax base is about 8.6 percent over the period, the new Walmart raises the tax base growth only an 
additional 5.2 percent (0.45/8.6). 
From column 5 of Table 5 we see that a new Walmart in municipality i has a statistically 
significant effect on the growth in the real equalized non-residential values in municipality i only 
in the first year it is open (OpnYr/Acres t).  This is no doubt the direct impact of adding the value 
of Walmart property to the tax base (as opposed to changes in property values in proximity to the 
Walmart).  If we evaluate the estimate at mean acreage for the data set (8,431 acres), we see that 
the real equalized residential values growth rate rises 0.32 percentage points (28.68/8,431). 
Despite this, we find no subsequent impact from the Walmart on the non-residential equalized 
tax base growth (OpnYr/Acres t-1 and OpnYr/Acres t-2).  
Taken together with the results for the OpnYr/Acres estimates in Tables 3 and 4, this 
result suggests that the impact of the Walmart on the tax base is primarily from the Walmart’s 
impact on residential values. Recall that: 1) only OpnYr/Acres t-1 was significant in the tax base 
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estimates and the residential value estimates; 2) the magnitude of the OpnYr/Acres t-1 estimate is 
slightly higher in the residential values estimates; and 3) residential values are about 75 percent 
of the total tax base on average.  While the OpnYr/Acres t is significant in the non-residential 
equation, the effect is essentially buried in the total tax base likely because the non-residential 
base is only about 25 percent of the total tax base.  
A somewhat different picture emerges for the impact of a new Walmart on the closest 
adjacent municipality. From column 5 of Table 4 we see that a new Walmart in municipality i 
has no statistically significant effect on the growth in the real equalized residential values in the 
adjacent municipality in the first year it is open (OpnYr/Acres t). In the second and third years 
the effect is statistically significant but the parameter estimates have different signs. As a 
consequence the net effect of the Walmart on residential values in the adjacent municipality is 
close to zero.  If we evaluate the estimate for the second year (OpnYr/Acres t-1) at the mean 
acreage for the data set (8,431 acres), we see that the real equalized residential values growth 
rate rises 0.21 percentage points (17.76/8,431). If we evaluate the estimate for the third year 
(OpnYr/Acres t-2) at mean acreage for the data set, we see that the real equalized residential 
values growth rate falls 0.13 percentage points (11.18/8,431). One possible interpretation of this 
result is that proximity to the Walmart initially raises residential values but the subsequent loss 
of local businesses from the Walmart lowers the values.  
Thus, the negative and significant effects of a new Walmart on the overall tax base of the 
closest adjacent municipality in years one and two are primarily the result of the impact of the 
Walmart on the growth rate of the equalized non-residential tax base. From column 5 of Table 5 
we see that a new Walmart in municipality i has a statistically significant and negative effect on 
the growth in the real equalized non-residential values in the adjacent municipality in the first 
year it is open (Adj OpnYr/Acres t) and in the second year (Adj OpnYr/Acres t-1). If we evaluate 
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the estimate for the first and second years at the mean acreage for the data set, we see that the 
real equalized non-residential values growth rate rises 0.06 and 0.1 percentage points, 
respectively (5.25/8,431 and 8.62/8.431). Given the estimates in Table 3 and that the non-
residential base is on average only about a quarter of the total tax base, we would expect these 
estimates to be a bit higher.  
 Looking across Tables 4 and 5 we can see that the controls are more often significant in 
the non-residential estimates. First, the non-residential base is more sensitive to changes in the 
tax rate. A ten percent increase in the tax rate in year t-2 reduces the growth in non-residential 
values after two years by 0.11 percentage points. For the residential values, growth in the tax rate 
is not significant. The tax rate level also produces a stronger effect in the non-residential 
estimates. A tax rate level that is higher by one dollar in year t-2 is associated with growth in the 
non-residential values that is 9.1 percentage points higher but that same one dollar increase 
causes an increase of only 5.5 percentage points in the case of the residential values. While the 
level of residential values has no effect on the growth of residential values, the level of non-
residential values has a significant positive impact on the growth of non-residential values. This 
suggests non-residential development clusters but residential development does not. However, 
the effect of the level of non-residential values on the growth of non-residential values is modest: 
a $100,000 increase the non-residential values per acre raises the growth rate by only 0.027 
percentage points.  
Finally, the level of language test scores and the growth in language test scores exert a 
stronger effect on non-residential growth. An increase of one standard deviation in language 
scores increases the growth of non-residential values by 2.0 percentage points but has no impact 
on the growth of the residential values. Growth in language scores causes a statistically 
significant reduction in growth across both residential and non-residential values; however, the 
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effect in each case is very small.  Ten percent growth in language scores reduces residential 
value growth by 0.0064 percent and non-residential values growth by 0.0075 percent.  
 
V. Conclusion 
Municipal governments often wrestle with the fiscal implications of a new Walmart. 
Proponents argue that the new Walmart will expand the tax base both directly and indirectly. 
Direct effects follow from adding the market value of the Walmart outlet to the tax base and 
indirect effects follow from the convenient access to low prices on a wide range of consumer 
goods. Because indirect effects are typically capitalized into house prices, they also add to the 
tax base. By contrast, opponents contend that the indirect effects of Walmart are generally 
negative. In their view, residential property values will fall because the Walmart will cause 
congestion, noise, and trash. Worse yet, competition from Walmart will drive other local also 
retailers into bankruptcy.  
Following the contours of this debate, this paper measures the impact of 30 Walmart 
openings on the growth of the municipal tax base across a three-year period using panel data for 
New Jersey municipalities from 1998-2007. Because the nearest adjacent municipality to the 
new Walmart does not receive the direct benefit of adding the market value of the Walmart 
outlet to the tax base, we assess the impact of the Walmart in its home municipality and the 
closest adjacent municipality. To better understand the mechanics of Walmart’s impact on the 
tax base, we also decompose the tax base into residential and non-residential values.  
We find that a Walmart has a significant positive impact on the growth in the tax base in 
host municipalities the second year that it is open, but not in years one and three. In addition, the 
impact of the Walmart on the growth of the tax base depends on the size of the municipality. In 
the average sized municipality for our sample, the real equalized tax base growth rate rises only 
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about 0.35 percentage points. If we evaluate the impact of a new Walmart in a municipality in 
the 10
th
 percentile (509 acres) of the size distribution, we see that the real equalized tax base 
growth rate rises 5.9 percentage points.  
However, much of the increase in growth in the home municipality is offset by decreases 
in growth in the closest adjacent municipality. We find that the new Walmart causes a modest 
but consistently negative effect on growth of the tax base in the adjacent municipality across all 
three years that we are able to measure. In the average sized municipality for our sample, the real 
equalized tax base growth rate falls rate falls 0.065, 0.081, and 0.096 percentage points 
respectively. Thus, the cumulative effect of the reduction in growth is roughly two thirds of the 
increase in growth experienced by the home municipality.   
If we decompose the tax base into residential and non-residential values, we can identify 
the source of the impact on the tax base growth from a new Walmart. We find that the source of 
the impact varies depending on whether we are considering the impact on the home municipality 
or the closest adjacent municipality. As noted above, we find a positive effect on tax base growth 
for the home municipality in the second year the Walmart is open. This impact is primarily the 
result of Walmart’s impact on residential values. We are able to identify a direct effect from the 
Walmart on the growth of non-residential values the first year the Walmart is open in the home 
municipality. However, this direct effect is not manifest in the growth of the overall tax base the 
first year the Walmart is open.  
By contrast, the tax base impact of a new Walmart on the closest adjacent municipality 
occurs primarily through the Walmart’s impact on growth of non-residential values. The 
negative and significant effects of a new Walmart on the overall tax base of the closest adjacent 
municipality in years one and two are primarily the result of the impact of the Walmart on the 
growth rate of the non-residential values. This suggests that the impact of the Walmart on the 
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closest adjacent municipality is not primarily from trash, noise and congestion but rather its 
impact on local businesses.    
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Real Equalized Tax Base Growth, Real Equalized Residential Value 
Growth, and Real Equalized Non-Residential Value Growth 
 
Year 
Tax Base Growth
a
 
Residential Values 
Growth
b
 
Non-Residential Values 
Growth
c
 
   
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
1999 0.0256 0.0384 0.0276 0.0595 0.0131 0.0611 
2000 0.0444 0.0521 0.0499 0.0537 0.0275 0.0682 
2001 0.0718 0.0585 0.0747 0.0621 0.0619 0.0707 
2002 0.0961 0.1329 0.1008 0.1365 0.0781 0.1312 
2003 0.1173 0.1464 0.1210 0.1441 0.1018 0.1676 
2004 0.1076 0.0619 0.1109 0.0675 0.0955 0.1361 
2005 0.1186 0.1032 0.1244 0.1032 0.0966 0.1377 
2006 0.1084 0.0641 0.1191 0.0705 0.0890 0.1160 
2007 0.0443 0.0494 0.0520 0.0552 0.0253 0.0792 
1999-2007 0.0816 0.0930 0.0867 0.0937 0.0654 0.1181 
       n 5076 
 
5057 
 
5066 
  
a
  Tax Base Growth  = (Real Equalized Tax Baseit – Real Equalized Tax Baseit-1)/ Real Equalized Tax Baseit-1   
for municipality i in period t (GDP deflator, 2005 dollars).  
b 
 Residential Values Growth  = (Real Equalized Residential Valuesit – Real Equalized Residential Valuesit-1) 
/ Real Equalized Residential Valuesit-1  for municipality i in period t (GDP deflator, 2005 dollars).  
c
 Non-Residential Values Growth  = (Real Equalized Non-Residential Valuesit – Real Equalized Non-Residential  
Valuesit-1)/ Real Equalized Non-Residential Valuesit-1  for municipality i in period t (GDP deflator, 2005 dollars).  
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Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations for Independent Variables 
Variable n Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Acres
a
 563 8,431.8 11,724.6 
Tax Base per Acre
b
 5630 570.32 774.84 
Res Val per Acre
c
 5629 429.48 615.38 
Non-res Val per Acre
d
 5629 140.93 246.14 
Tax Rate
e
 5630 2.248 0.8416 
Tax Rate Growth
f
  5067 -0.0347 0.0815 
Lang Scores
g
 5630 -0.0000899 0.9994 
Lang Scores Growth
h
 5067 -0.1282 9.74 
 
a
 Acresi = total area in municipality i (measured in acres). 
b
 Tax Base per Acreit = total real equalized tax base in municipality i in year t divided by total acres in  
municipality i (in thousands of 2005 dollars, GDP deflator).  
c
 Residential Value per Acreit = total real equalized residential property value in municipality i in year t  
divided by total acres in municipality i (in thousands of 2005 dollars, GDP deflator).  
d
 Non-res Value per Acreit = total real equalized non-residential property value in municipality i in year t  
divided by total acres in municipality i (in thousands of 2005 dollars, GDP deflator). 
e
 Tax Rateit = total equalized property tax rate per $100 of assessed value for municipality i in year t. 
f 
Tax Rate Growth  = (Tax Rateit – Tax Rateit-1)/ Tax Rate it-1  for municipality i in period t.  
g
 Lang Scores = normalized language score on the 11
th
 grade New Jersey High School Proficiency  
Assessment (HSPA) test for municipality i in period t.  
h 
Lang Scores Growth = (Normalized Language Scoreit – Normalized Language Scoreit-1)/ Normalized  
Language Scoreit-1  for municipality i in period t (GDP deflator, 2005 dollars). 
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Table  3. Regressions for Growth of the Tax Base  
 
  Tax Base 
Growth 
Tax Base 
Growth 
Tax Base 
Growth 
Tax Base 
Growth 
Constant -0.119*** -0.119* -0.120*** -0.120* 
 (0.0301) (0.0690) (0.0302) (0.0690) 
Tax Rate Growth t-2 -0.0688** -0.0688* -0.0676** -0.0676* 
 
(0.0305) (0.0394) (0.0304) (0.0385) 
Tax Rate t-2 0.0679*** 0.0679*** 0.0683*** 0.0683*** 
 
(0.0104) (0.0206) (0.0104) (0.0210) 
Tax Base per Acre 0.000041*** 0.000041 0.000041*** 0.000041 
 
(0.000013) (0.000043) (0.000013) (0.000043) 
OpnYr/Acres t 
a
 9.14 9.14 8.11 8.11 
 
(16.69) (10.65) (15.72) (10.61) 
OpenYr/Acres t-1 38.03 38.03*** 30.14 30.14* 
 
(28.18) (14.59) (25.31) (16.01) 
OpenYr/Acres t-2 17.83 17.83 15.13 15.13 
 
(39.92) (23.17) (38.42) (23.43) 
Adj OpenYr/Acres t b -4.89*** -4.89** -5.46*** -5.45*** 
 
(1.99) (2.08) (2.08) (1.89) 
Adj OpenYr/Acres t-1 -4.82 -4.82 -6.89** -6.89** 
 
(3.24) (3.45) (3.54) (2.97) 
Adj OpenYr/Acres t-2 -6.97*** -6.97* -8.06*** -8.06** 
 
(2.01) (3.93) (2.04) (3.94) 
Lang Scores t-2 
  
0.011** 0.011* 
   
(0.0056) (0.0061) 
Lang Scores Growth t-2 
  
-0.00065 -0.00065*** 
   
(0.00058) (0.00023) 
2002 dummy 
c
 0.0231*** 0.0231*** 0.0227*** 0.0227*** 
 
(0.0054) (0.0020) (0.0054) (0.0021) 
2003 dummy 0.0456*** 0.0456*** 0.0441*** 0.0441*** 
 
(0.0062) (0.0041) (0.0061) (0.0045) 
2004 dummy 0.0378*** 0.0378*** 0.0375*** 0.0375*** 
 
(0.0038) (0.0057) (0.0038) (0.0058) 
2005 dummy 0.0516*** 0.0516*** 0.0514*** 0.0514*** 
 
(0.0054) (0.0081) (0.0051) (0.0082) 
2006 dummy 0.0456*** 0.0456*** 0.0461*** 0.0461*** 
 
(0.0061) (0.0103) (0.0061) (0.0101) 
2007 dummy -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
  (0.0067) (0.0102) (0.0068) (0.0102) 
     R2 (within) 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
n 3941 3941 3941 3941 
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*Significant at 0.1 level  **Significant at 0.05 level  ***Significant at 0.01 level 
Robust standard errors for regressions in columns 2 and 4. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors for regressions in column 
3 and 5. 
 
a
 OpnYr/Acres t = dummy variable indicating whether a Walmart opened in municipality i in year t divided by the 
area of municipality i measured in acres.  
b
 Adj OpnYr/Acres t = dummy variable indicating the closest municipality i to the home municipality in which a 
Walmart opened in year t divided by the area of municipality i measured in acres.  
c 
2002-2007 dummy =  dummy variable indicating year.  
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Table 4. Regressions for the Growth of Residential Values  
 
  Res Value 
Growth 
Res Value 
Growth  
Res Value 
Growth  
Res Value 
Growth  
Constant -0.0758*** -0.0758 -0.077*** -0.077 
 (0.0295) (0.0566) (0.0295) (0.0569) 
Tax Rate Growth t-2 -0.0510** -0.0510 -0.0498** -0.0499 
 
(0.0251) (0.0334) (0.0248) (0.0331) 
Tax Rate t-2 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.0554*** 0.0554*** 
 
(0.0105) (0.0169) (0.0105) (0.0170) 
Res Val per Acre 0.000033** 0.000033 0.000033** 0.000033 
 
(0.000015) (0.000052) (0.000015) (0.000052) 
OpnYr/Acres t 1.02 1.02 0.182 0.182 
 
(20.02) (13.06) (19.34) (12.71) 
OpenYr/Acres t-1 44.71* 44.71*** 38.01 38.01** 
 
(25.87) (14.46) (23.80) (16.15) 
OpenYr/Acres t-2 22.53 22.53 20.75 20.75 
 
(36.02) (14.77) (35.59) (15.78) 
Adj OpenYr/Acres t 2.59 2.59 2.3 2.30 
 
(9.18) (3.65) (9.50) (3.51) 
Adj OpenYr/Acres t-1 18.93** 18.93** 17.76** 17.76*** 
 
(8.81) (5.94) (8.96) (5.89) 
Adj OpenYr/Acres t-2 -8.84 -8.84** -11.18 -11.18** 
 
(11.40) (4.94) (11.63) (4.87) 
Lang Scores t-2 
 
0.0078 0.0078 
   
(0.0057) (0.0071) 
Lang Scores Growth t-2 -0.00064 -0.00064*** 
   
(0.00060) (0.00022) 
2002 dummy 0.0256*** 0.0256*** 0.0253*** 0.0253*** 
 
(0.0056) (0.0019) (0.0057) (0.0020) 
2003 dummy 0.0472*** 0.0473*** 0.0458*** 0.0458*** 
 
(0.0061) (0.0040) (0.0060) (0.0044) 
2004 dummy 0.0393*** 0.0393*** 0.0391*** 0.0391*** 
 
(0.0039) (0.0059) (0.0040) (0.0060) 
2005 dummy 0.0556*** 0.0556*** 0.0555*** 0.0555*** 
 
(0.0047) (0.0085) (0.0048) (0.0086) 
2006 dummy 0.0544*** 0.0544*** 0.0548*** 0.0548*** 
 
(0.0063) (0.0109) (0.0064) (0.0110) 
2007 dummy -0.0056 -0.0056 -0.0056 -0.0056 
  (0.0071) (0.0114) (0.0072) (0.0114) 
     R
2
 (within) 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 
N 3934 3934 3934 3934 
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*Significant at 0.1 level  **Significant at 0.05 level  ***Significant at 0.01 level 
Robust standard errors for regressions in columns 2 and 4. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors for regressions in column 
3 and 5. 
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Table 5. Regressions for Growth of Non-residential Values 
  Non-Res 
Growth 
Non-Res 
Growth 
Non-Res 
Growth 
Non-Res 
Growth 
Constant -0.201*** -0.201*** -0.200*** -0.200*** 
 (0.0321) (0.0436) (0.0316) (0.0447) 
Tax Rate Growth t-2 -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.109*** -0.109*** 
 
(0.0397) (0.0416) (0.0397) (0.0399) 
Tax Rate t-2 0.0909*** 0.0909*** 0.0908*** 0.0908*** 
 
(0.0111) (0.0150) (0.0109) (0.0154) 
Non-Res Val per Acre 0.000273*** 0.000273*** 0.000270*** 0.000270*** 
 
(0.000056) (0.000091) (0.000055) (0.000092) 
OpnYr/Acres t 30.38 30.38** 28.68 28.68* 
 
(23.46) (14.44) (21.82) (16.22) 
OpenYr/Acres t-1 22.54 22.54 10.73 10.73 
 
(37.33) (16.11) (32.13) (16.38) 
OpenYr/Acres t-2 43.67 43.67 38.39 38.39 
 
(80.49) (57.39) (76.65) (55.56) 
Adj OpenYr/Acres t -4.33 -4.33* -5.25* -5.25*** 
 
(2.95) (2.31) (3.09) (2.02) 
Adj OpenYr/Acres t-1 -5.71 -5.71 -8.62** -8.62** 
 
(3.68) (4.05) (4.03) (3.56) 
Adj OpenYr/Acres t-2 -19.34* -19.34 -23.69** -23.69 
 
(11.62) (17.08) (11.53) (16.99) 
Lang Scores t-2 
  
0.0201*** 0.0201*** 
   
(0.0081) (0.0081) 
Lang Scores Growth t-2 
  
-0.00075 -0.00075*** 
   
(0.00063) (0.00025) 
2002 dummy 0.0143*** 0.0143*** 0.0140*** 0.0140*** 
 
(0.0058) (0.0010) (0.0059) (0.0011) 
2003 dummy 0.0391*** 0.0391*** 0.0376*** 0.0376*** 
 
(0.0076) (0.0025) (0.0074) (0.0029) 
2004 dummy 0.0353*** 0.0353*** 0.0352*** 0.0352*** 
 
(0.0064) (0.0034) (0.0065) (0.0035) 
2005 dummy 0.0400*** 0.0400*** 0.0400*** 0.0400*** 
 
(0.0060) (0.0052) (0.0060) (0.0053) 
2006 dummy 0.0379*** 0.0379*** 0.0387*** 0.0387*** 
 
(0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0072) (0.0070) 
2007 dummy -0.0142** -0.0142* -0.0140** -0.0140* 
  (0.0072) (0.0082) (0.0072) (0.0082) 
     R2 (within) 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 
n 3934 3941 3941 3941 
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*Significant at 0.1 level  **Significant at 0.05 level  ***Significant at 0.01 level. 
Robust standard errors for regressions in columns 2 and 4. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors for regressions in column 
3 and 5. 
 
 
